Duncan Pritchard, "Epistemic Angst: Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of Our Believing" (Princeton UP, 2016)

Summary

Many are introduced to philosophy by way of a confrontation with the kind of radical skepticism associated with Rene Descartes: Might I right now be dreaming? Might everything I think I know be the product of some grand deception perpetrated by a malevolent demon? Today, many philosophers seems simply to dismiss radical skepticism as unworthy of our attention; however, the skeptical challenge lingers, and, for many, it still is a source of concern. In Epistemic Angst: Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of Our Believing (Princeton University Press, 2015), Duncan Pritchard offers a sustained response to radical skepticism. He first shows that radical skepticism comes in two varieties, each of which calls for its own response. He then offers a two-part solution to radical skepticism. Ultimately, Pritchard offers a cure for epistemic angst, but one that allows for ongoing insecurity about our epistemic condition.

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Robert Talisse

Robert Talisse is the W. Alton Jones Professor of Philosophy at Vanderbilt University.

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